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Abstract
1.	 Stakeholder	 cooperation	 can	 be	 vital	 in	 managing	 conservation	 conflicts.	
Laboratory	 experiments	 show	 cooperation	 is	 less	 likely	 in	 the	 presence	 of	
uncertainty.	Much	less	is	known	about	how	stakeholders	in	real-life	conservation	
conflicts	respond	to	different	types	of	uncertainty.
2.	 We	tested	the	effects	of	different	sources	of	uncertainty	on	cooperative	behaviour	
using	a	framed	field	experiment	and	interviews.	The	experiment	compared	a	baseline	
scenario	of	perfect	certainty	with	scenarios	including	either:	(a)	scientific	uncertainty	
about	 the	 effectiveness	 of	 a	 conflict-reduction	 intervention;	 (b)	 administrative	
uncertainty	about	intervention	funding;	or	(c)	political	uncertainty	about	the	extent	
of	community	support.	We	applied	these	scenarios	to	a	conservation	conflict	in	the	
Outer	Hebrides,	 Scotland,	 involving	 the	management	 of	 geese	 to	 simultaneously	
meet	both	conservation	and	farming	objectives.	We	asked	149	crofters	(small-scale	
farmers)	 if	 they	would	commit	 to	cooperate	with	others	by	helping	 fund	a	goose	
management	plan	given	the	three	sources	of	uncertainty.
3.	 On	 average,	 intention	 to	 cooperate	 was	 highest	 (99%)	 in	 scenarios	 without	
uncertainty,	 and	 lowest	 under	 administrative	 uncertainty	 (77%).	 Scientific	
uncertainty	and	political	uncertainty	both	had	less	of	an	effect,	with	over	95%	of	
crofters	 predicted	 to	 be	 willing	 to	 cooperate	 in	 these	 scenarios.	 Crofters	 who	
indicated	concern	for	other	crofters	suffering	the	impact	of	geese	were	more	likely	
to	cooperate.	The	longer	an	individual	had	been	a	crofter,	the	less	likely	they	were	
to	cooperate.
4.	 Synthesis and applications.	Crofters’	intention	to	cooperate	is	high	but	lessened	by	
uncertainty,	 especially	 over	 the	 commitment	 from	 other	 stakeholders	 such	 as	
government,	to	cooperate	on	goose	management.	Existing	cooperation	on	goose	
management	may	be	at	risk	if	uncertainty	is	not	reduced	outright	or	commitments	
between	parties	are	not	strengthened.	This	has	wide	applicability,	supporting	the	
need	for	 researchers	and	government	advisers	 to:	 (a)	determine	how	uncertainty	
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1  | INTRODUC TION
Conflicts	 in	conservation	are	ubiquitous	around	 the	globe	and	are	
damaging	to	both	conservation	efforts	and	people's	 lives	(Redpath	
et	al.,	2013).	Fostering	cooperation	between	stakeholders	with	con-
flicting	values	is	a	priority	of	conservation	conflict	management	as	
it	 builds	 trust	 and	 reduces	 conflict,	 both	under	 experimental	 con-
ditions	and	 in	real-	life	 (Yamagishi,	2005;	Young	et	al.,	2016b).	One	
important	factor	that	reduces	the	chances	of	achieving	cooperation	
in	conflict	is	uncertainty,	which	will	generally	decrease	the	tendency	
to	trust	and	cooperate	(Rapoport,	Sundali,	&	Seale,	1996).	Rittel	and	
Webber	 (1973)	describe	 three	broad	sources	of	uncertainty	 in	 so-
cial	ecological	systems	(SES):	scientific	uncertainty	from	incomplete	
knowledge	of	 the	 research	 system;	 political	 uncertainty	 regarding	
power	relationships	and	values;	and	administrative	uncertainty	sur-
rounding	cost	and	responsibilities.
Experimental	economics	methods	have	been	used	to	test	coop-
eration	 in	 collective-	action	 problems	 (Cárdenas	 &	Ostrom,	 2004),	
including	 in	 the	presence	or	 absence	of	 uncertainty.	 For	 example,	
Barrett	 and	Dannenberg	 (2012)	used	 laboratory	experiments	with	
volunteers	to	investigate	decision-	making	in	the	context	of	climate	
change	negotiations,	showing	that	uncertainty	of	the	position	of	an	
emission	threshold	resulted	 in	 lower	cooperation	than	uncertainty	
surrounding	the	impacts	of	exceeding	that	threshold.	However,	vol-
unteers	 in	 a	 laboratory	 setting	will	 act	 differently	 to	 stakeholders	
in	a	real-	world	situation	 (Levitt	&	List,	2007).	Working	with	stake-
holders	 involved	 in	 a	 conservation	 conflict	 (rather	 than	 with	 vol-
unteers)	and	framing	the	experiment	in	a	way	which	reflects	a	real	
collective-	action	 problem,	 allows	 real-	life	 aspects	 of	 the	 conflict	
such	as	knowledge	of	the	system,	underlying	values	and	perceptions	
of	others,	 to	be	taken	 into	account.	Here,	we	use	an	experimental	
economics	method	to	explore	how	three	types	of	uncertainty	(sci-
entific	 uncertainty,	 administrative	 uncertainty	 and	 political	 uncer-
tainty)	influence	the	intention	to	cooperate,	of	people	in	a	real-	life	
conservation	conflict.
Conservation	 conflicts	 involving	 the	 damage	 of	 crops	 by	 wild-
life	 are	 widespread	 globally	 (Treves,	 Wallace,	 Naughton-Treves,	 &	
Morales,	 2006).	 In	Northern	 Europe,	 reduction	 of	 agricultural	 yield	
due	to	grazing	of	wild	geese	 is	a	well-	documented	problem	(Cusack	
et	al.,	 2018;	 Simonsen,	 Tombre,	 &	Madsen,	 2017).	Methods	 for	 re-
ducing	 goose	 damage	 to	 crops	 include	 regulating	 population	 (e.g.	
shooting),	non-	lethal	scaring	or	providing	sacrificial	feeding	areas	(Fox,	
Elmberg,	Tombre,	&	Hessel,	2016).	Stakeholders	involved	in	a	goose	
conflict	 can	 include	 those	who:	 suffer	 directly	 from	goose	damage;	
wish	to	maintain	the	conservation	status	of	the	geese	and	their	habi-
tat;	are	responsible	for	scientific	support	of	management;	are	required	
to	fulfil	practical	management	activities;	and,	provide	funding	or	prac-
tical	support.	Mapping	the	specific	stakeholders	and	uncertainties	has	
been	 identified	 an	 important	 step	 in	understanding	 the	 context	 for	
conservation	 conflict	 management	 (Redpath	 et	al.,	 2013);	 however,	
less	is	known	regarding	how	cooperative	behaviour	of	stakeholders	in	
a	conflict	is	affected	by	different	sources	of	uncertainty.
In	this	paper,	we	test	how	scientific,	administrative	and	politi-
cal	uncertainties	impact	on	stakeholders’	willingness	to	cooperate	
on	goose	management	 in	 the	Outer	Hebrides,	 Scotland.	Resident	
greylag	goose	(Anser anser)	numbers	have	been	increasing	steadily	
from	 historic	 low	 points	 in	 the	 mid-	twentieth	 century,	 to	 record	
highs.	While	this	is	seen	by	many	as	a	conservation	success	story,	
the	geese	are	responsible	for	damage	to	arable	crops	and	to	pasture	
intended	for	livestock.	(Bainbridge,	2017;	Mitchell,	Griffin,	Trinder,	
&	Newth,	2010).	The	majority	of	agricultural	activity	 in	the	Outer	
Hebrides	takes	place	on	crofts;	small-	scale	farms	of	typically	5	ha,	
culturally	unique	to	the	more	remote	and	less	productive	areas	of	
the	Highlands	and	Islands	of	Scotland.	Crofting	is	regarded	histor-
ically	and	legally	as	a	distinct	category	of	farming	in	Scotland	and	
is	 recognised	 by	 the	 Scottish	Government	 as	 being	 vital	 in	main-
taining	the	population	of	remote	areas,	supporting	local	businesses	
and	 managing	 important	 natural	 habitats	 (Scottish	 Government,	
2016).	 Crofters	 (farmers	 of	 croft	 land)	 impacted	 by	 geese	 essen-
tially	 take	 part	 in	 a	 form	of	 public	 goods	 game,	where	 they	 each	
choose	whether	to	voluntarily	contribute	to	the	maintenance	of	a	
non-	excludable,	 non-	rivalrous	 public	 good	 (cooperate	with	 goose	
management	 by	 contributing	 to	 scaring	 actions)	 or	 not	 (defect).	
Defection	 is	 less	 costly	 in	 the	 short	 term	 where	 benefits	 of	 the	
public	good	can	be	obtained	without	contribution	(elsewhere	called	
free-	riding)	but	runs	the	risk	of	 losing	the	benefits	should	enough	
others	do	the	same.
Presenting	crofters	with	a	set	of	four	public	goods	scenarios	for	
goose	management—a	baseline	with	no	uncertainty	and	three	treat-
ments	with	differing	sources	of	uncertainty—we	aimed	to:
1.	 examine	 how	 crofters’	 intention	 to	 cooperate	 was	 influenced	
by	 different	 types	 of	 uncertainty
2.	 determine	which	variables	(e.g.	crofting	location,	time	spent	as	a	
crofter,	experiences	of	goose	damage)	were	most	 important	 for	
describing	cooperative	behaviour.
will	 impact	 intention	 of	 stakeholders	 to	 cooperate;	 and	 (b)	 take	 steps	 (such	 as	
uncertainty	reduction,	communication	or	acceptance)	to	reduce	the	negative	impact	
of	uncertainty	on	cooperation.
K E Y W O R D S
conflict,	conservation	management,	decision-making,	experimental	economics,	goose,	public	
goods	game,	uncertainty
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2  | MATERIAL S AND METHODS
2.1 | Study area
North	Uist,	Benbecula	and	South	Uist	(hereafter,	the	Uists),	are	part	
of	 the	Outer	Hebrides;	 an	 island	chain	off	 the	northwest	 coast	of	
Scotland,	UK.	The	Uists	provide	year-	round	habitat	for	greylag	geese	
which	 damage	 both	 arable	 crop	 and	 pasture	 (Bainbridge,	 2017).	
Non-	lethal	goose	scaring	methods	have	limited	success	(Simonsen,	
Madsen,	Tombre,	&	Nabe-Nielsen,	2016).	Greylag	geese	can	be	le-
gally	shot	during	a	winter	open	season	(September	to	February).	Out	
of	season,	geese	can	be	shot	under	licence	only.
Goose	management	efforts	had	been	ongoing	for	over	a	decade,	
but	in	2012,	a	new	multi-	stakeholder	local	goose	management	group	
(LGMG),	 funded	 by	 the	 Scottish	 Government	 was	 created	 in	 the	
Uists.	Stakeholders	 include	crofters,	government,	conservation	or-
ganisations,	croft	owners	and	recreational	wildfowl	shooters	(SNH,	
2016).	A	5-	year	adaptive	management	pilot	was	designed	to	test	if	
shooting	levels	could	be	managed	to	decrease	goose	damage	whilst	
maintaining	the	conservation	status	of	the	geese	(SNH,	2016).	The	
pilot	uses	a	mixture	of	volunteer	and	paid	shooters	who	spend	sev-
eral	 hours	 a	 day	 in	 designated	 areas,	 carrying	out	 lethal	 and	non-	
lethal	 scaring	 throughout	August	and	September.	The	pilot	 covers	
areas	on	the	western	side	of	 the	Uists	where	the	arable	crops	are	
grown	and	uses	population	modelling	to	determine	annual	shooting	
targets	(SNH,	2016).
2.2 | Crofter recruitment and data collection
In	August	2016,	a	list	of	all	crofts	in	Uist	(N	=	1,579)	was	obtained	
(Registers	of	Scotland,	2016).	Potential	interviewees	were	sequen-
tially	approached	down	a	randomised	copy	of	the	list,	until	the	end	
of	the	data	collection	campaign	in	November	2016.	This	resulted	
in	149	crofters	agreeing	to	be	interviewed.	We	used	face-	to-	face	
interviews	to	ensure	crofters’	understanding	of	the	questions	and	
to	 capture	 qualitative	 responses	 accurately.	 Information	 from	
crofters	 on	 themselves,	 their	 crofting	 and	 their	 experiences	 of	
goose	 impact	was	 collected	using	 a	 structured	questionnaire,	 to	
allow	 statistical	 analyses	 on	 the	 data	 collected	 (Newing,	 2011).	
For	full	recruitment,	pilot	and	collection	methods,	see	Supporting	
Information.	 Ethical	 approval	 for	 this	 study	 was	 granted	 by	
Biological	and	Environmental	Sciences	Ethical	Review	Committee,	
University	of	Stirling.
2.3 | Willingness to pay
Crofters	were	asked	if	they	would	be	willing	to	pay	(WTP)	an	annual	
fee	along	with	other	crofters,	for	a	project	which	would	completely	
mitigate	all	the	negative	impacts	of	the	geese,	using	a	contingent	val-
uation	technique	(Pearce,	Ece,	&	Özedemiroglu,	2002).	Those	who	
were	 unwilling	 to	 pay	were	 asked	 to	 give	 reasons.	 The	 responses	
were	then	coded	post-	hoc	using	theoretical	thematic	analysis	(Braun	
&	 Clarke,	 2006).	 Those	who	 responded	 that	 they	would	 be	WTP	
were	then	asked	to	indicate	how	much	they	would	pay	annually	into	
a	fund	with	other	crofters	for	100%	mitigation	of	the	negative	goose	
impacts	(hereafter,	the	WTP	amount	or	Cwtp).	The	primary	aim	was	to	
identify	a	WTP	amount	for	each	individual	which	could	then	be	used	
in	the	subsequent	cooperation	scenario.	This	was	done	to	account	
for	individual	differences	in	value	placed	on	goose	impact	reduction.	
The	stated	WTP	amount	was	then	repeatedly	used	in	each	coopera-
tion	scenario	(see	below).	Where	crofters	were	WTP	but	could	not	
specify	an	amount,	the	modal	WTP	amount	identified		during	piloting	
(£50	per	year)	was	used	as	Cwtp.
2.4 | Cooperation scenario
We	presented	crofters	with	 four	 scenarios,	each	detailing	a	hypo-
thetical	goose	management	plan,	using	summary	cards	 (see	Figure	
S1).	Crofters	could	choose	to	either	support	 the	plan	 (intention	to	
cooperate),	or	not	(intention	to	defect).	Both	choices	incurred	a	cost	
to	the	crofter,	a	resulting	reduction	in	goose	impact,	and	a	thresh-
old	number	of	crofters	that	would	be	required	for	the	management	
plan	to	be	enacted.	This	choice	is	akin	to	a	public	good	game,	where	
the	 crofter's	 payoff	 (a	 utility	 function	made	 up	 of	 the	 sum	of	 the	
level	of	goose	impact	and	cost	of	joining	a	goose	management	plan)	
is	dependent	on	their	own	course	of	action	as	well	as	the	actions	of	
others	(to	meet	the	threshold	number	required)	(Table	1).	The	goose	
management	plan	outlined	in	the	baseline	scenario	resulted	in	a	de-
crease	of	negative	goose	 impact	 (Cd)	down	to	half	 the	current	 im-
pact	levels.	The	WTP	amount	(Cwtp)	previously	stated	by	the	crofter	
was	 for	 100%	 reduction	 in	 negative	 goose	 impact.	 Therefore,	 the	
cost	to	each	crofter	(Cmp)	of	a	management	plan	which	achieved	half	
that	reduction	as	 is	the	case	 in	the	baseline	scenario,	was	0.5Cwtp. 
The	management	plan	was	presented	as	 receiving	partial	payment	
from	government	funds	equal	to	0.25Cwtp,	so	a	cooperating	crofter	
would	receive	a	50%	reduction	in	goose	impact	for	a	Cmp	=	0.25Cwtp. 
This	 resulted	 in	a	 total	payoff	 to	 the	crofter	of	Cd	+	Cmp	=	0.5Cwtp 
+	0.25Cwtp	=	0.75Cwtp.	However,	the	hypothetical	management	plan	
needed	 the	 number	 of	 crofters	 signing	 up	 (Nc)	 to	 be	 at	 least	 half	
of	all	 the	crofters	 in	the	Uists	 (N).	 If	 this	threshold	 (Nc/N)	was	not	
reached,	 crofters	did	not	pay	 anything	 (Cmp	=	0)	 but	 there	was	no	
goose	impact	reduction	(Cd	=	Cwtp),	so	total	payoff	is	Cd	+	Cmp	=	Cwtp 
+	0	=	Cwtp.	Choosing	to	defect	always	set	Cmp	=	0.	The	crofter	then	
suffered	the	full	negative	 impact	 if	 the	threshold	was	not	reached	
(as	above),	or	if	the	threshold	was	reached	the	crofter	received	the	
benefit	of	impact	reduction	without	paying	for	the	cost.
Three	other	scenarios	were	the	same	as	the	baseline,	but	each	
contained	a	single	type	of	uncertainty	(Table	1):
•	 The	‘Scientific’	scenario	was	described	to	crofters	as	representing	
managers’	 incomplete	 knowledge	 of	 goose	 ecology	 resulting	 in	
uncertainty	to	impact	reduction,	Cd.
•	 The	‘Administrative’	scenario	was	described	as	representing	man-
agers’	 incomplete	knowledge	of	public	 funding	 for	 the	manage-
ment	plan	resulting	in	uncertainty	to	the	cost	of	the	plan	to	the	
crofter,	Cmp.
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•	 The	‘Political’	scenario	was	described	as	representing	managers’	
incomplete	knowledge	of	how	much	support	would	be	needed	for	
the	plan	to	be	initiated,	resulting	in	uncertainty	to	the	threshold	
of	cooperation	required	from	crofters,	Thuc.
The	baseline	was	always	presented	to	crofters	first,	and	the	fol-
lowing	three	treatments	were	randomised.	The	fixed	annual	costs	
remain	 the	 same	 so	 as	 time	 increases,	 the	 average	payoffs	 for	 all	
four	scenarios	become	equivalent	(Table	S1).	To	evaluate	the	croft-
ers’	beliefs	about	how	others	would	behave	 in	 the	same	scenario,	
we	used	a	wager	method.	After	each	decision,	crofters	were	asked	
to	estimate	what	percentage	of	all	 the	crofters	 in	the	Uists	would	
cooperate,	by	splitting	a	hypothetical	£20	wager	between	20	equal	
cells	each	representing	a	5%	block	of	the	population.	For	example,	
if	the	crofter	thought	that	between	46%	and	55%	of	others	would	
cooperate,	 they	 would	 write	 ‘10’	 in	 each	 of	 the	 ‘46%–50%’	 and	
‘51%–55%’	cells.	If	the	crofter	felt	they	could	not	estimate	or	they	
felt	there	was	an	equal	chance	of	all	outcomes,	they	would	write	‘1’	
in	each	of	 the	20	cells.	A	 fixed	wager	allowed	crofters	 to	express	
confidence	 in	 their	 prediction,	 responding	with	 the	wager	 spread	
over	a	large	or	small	range.
2.5 | Statistical analyses
To	examine	how	uncertainty	affects	the	intention	to	cooperate,	as	
well	 as	 which	 background	 and	 impact	 experience	 characteristics	
most	strongly	predict	intent	to	cooperate,	we	ran	four	linear	mixed	
effects	models.	Analyses	were	 focused	on	how	 intention	to	coop-
erate	 and	WTP	 for	 goose	management	 were	 influenced	 by	 three	
groups	of	variables.	Firstly,	the	value	a	crofter	places	on	cooperation	
may	depend	on	their	current	situation	 including	size	of	their	croft,	
the	 extent	 of	 their	 crofting	 experience	 or	 their	 existing	 access	 to	
goose	management	support	via	the	croft	owner	or	LGMG.	Secondly,	
intention	to	cooperate	may	stem	from	wanting	to	mitigate	personal	
impacts	 of	 geese	 such	 as	 time	 and	money	 costs.	We	 also	 include	
variables	to	capture	crofters	wishing	to	mitigate	goose	 impacts	on	
their	 community	 or	 on	 natural	 habitats.	 Finally,	 crofters	 who	 are	
aware	of	existing	goose	management	through	formal	organisations	
may	support	cooperation	with	other	crofters,	or	conversely	believe	
that	responsibility	lies	elsewhere.	The	individual	variables	for	each	of	
the	groups	are	shown	Table	2.
Firstly,	for	each	analysis	a	‘global’	model	was	built	containing	the	
predictor	 and	 random	 variables	 thought	 relevant	 to	 that	 analysis.	
The	function	‘dredge’	(r	package	MuMin)	was	then	used	on	the	global	
models	to	build	and	rank	models	by	finite-	sample	corrected	Akaike	
information	 criteria	 values	 (AICc)	 calculated	 using	maximum	 likeli-
hood.	No	interactions	between	variables	resulted	in	a	better	fitted	
model,	according	 to	AICc.	Best-	fitting	models	 (ΔAICc	<	2)	were	 re-
tained	and	were	then	standardised	by	dividing	the	continuous	fixed	
variables	 by	 two	 standard	 deviations	 allowing	 direct	 comparison	
of	 coefficients	 between	 continuous	 and	binary	 variables	 (Gelman,	
2008).
The	area	under	the	curve	(AUC)	of	receiver	operating	character-
istic	(ROC)	plots	was	calculated	for	all	models	with	a	binary	output	
TABLE  1 Crofter	payoff	(per	year)	matrices	under	four	treatments	of	varied	uncertainty.	Here,	payoffs	are	costs	to	the	crofter,	so	rational	
behaviour	seeks	to	minimise	total	costs	under	each	treatment.	Total	cost	to	the	crofter	in	bold,	is	the	sum	of	the	respective	cost	of	
management	plan	(Cmp)	and	the	cost	of	the	negative	goose	impacts	(Cd).	Table	S2	shows	a	worked	example
Scenario Cooperation threshold Cooperate Defect
Baseline Nc	<	0.5N Cmp = 0 
Cd	=	Cwtp
=Cwtp Cmp = 0 
Cd	=	Cwtp
= Cwtp
Nc	≥	0.5N Cmp	=	0.25Cwtp
Cd	=	0.5Cwtp
=0.75Cwtp Cmp = 0 
Cd	=	0.5Cwtp
=0.5Cwtp
Scientific
Duc	=	Dlow	or	Dhigh,	where
P(Dlow)	=	P(Dhigh)		=	0.5
Nc	<	0.5N Cmp = 0 
Cd	=	Cwtp
=Cwtp Cmp = 0 
Cd	=	Cwtp
=Cwtp
Nc	≥	0.5N Cmp	=	0.25Cwtp
Cd	=	Duc
=0.25Cwtp+Duc Cmp = 0 
Cd	=	Duc
=Duc
Administrative
Cuc	=	0	or	Chigh, 
where
P(0)	=	P(Chigh)		=	0.5
Nc	<	0.5N Cmp = 0 
Cd	=	Cwtp
=Cwtp Cmp = 0 
Cd	=	Cwtp
=Cwtp
Nc	≥	0.5N Cmp	=	Cuc
Cd	=	0.5Cwtp
=Cuc + 0.5Cwtp Cmp = 0 
Cd	=	0.5Cwtp
=0.5Cwtp
Political
Thuc	=	Thlow	or	Thhigh,	where
P(Thlow)		=	P(Thhigh)	=	0.5
Nc	<	Thuc Cmp = 0 
Cd	=	Cwtp
=Cwtp Cmp = 0 
Cd	=	Cwtp
=Cwtp
Nc	≥	Thuc Cmp	=	0.25Cwtp
Cd	=	0.5Cwtp
=0.75Cwtp Cmp = 0 
Cd	=	0.5Cwtp
=0.5Cwtp
Nc,	total	number	of	crofters	choosing	“cooperate”;	N,	total	population	of	crofters	in	the	Uists;	Cmp,	cost	of	management	plan;	Cd,	cost	of	negative	goose	
impacts;	Cwtp,	crofter	WTP	to	eliminate	all	current	negative	goose	impact;	Cuc,	cost	of	management	plan	under	uncertainty;	Chigh	=	0.5Cwtp,	high	cost;	
Duc,	cost	of	negative	goose	impacts	caused	under	uncertainty;	Dlow	=	0.25Cwtp,	low	level	of	damage;	Dhigh	=	0.75Cwtp,	high	level	of	damage;	Thuc,	thresh-
old	 number	 of	 crofters	 choosing	 “cooperate”	 required	 for	 management	 plan	 to	 be	 enacted	 under	 uncertainty;	 Thlow	=	0.25N,	 low	 threshold;	
Thhigh	=	0.75N,	high	threshold.
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variable	to	assess	the	ability	of	each	model	to	correctly	discriminate	
between	a	randomly	chosen	positive	response	and	a	randomly	cho-
sen	 negative	 response.	 A	 value	 of	 0.7	 or	 greater	 was	 considered	
as	 having	 acceptable	 discriminatory	 ability	 (Sommerville,	 Milner-
Gulland,	Rahajaharison,	&	Jones,	2010).
All	model	analyses	were	done	 in	RStudio	version	1.0.136,	 run-
ning r	 version	 3.1.2.	 and	 using	 r	 packages	 lMe4	 (Bates,	 Mächler,	
Bolker,	&	Walker,	2014),	glMMADMB	(Bolker,	Skaug,	Magnusson,	&	
Nielsen,	2012)	and	pROC	(Robin	et	al.,	2011).
2.6 | Intention to cooperate
Two	global	models	were	 built	 to	 investigate	 intention	 to	 cooperate.	
The	first	willingness	to	pay	(WTP)	global	model	included	all	crofters,	
whereas	the	second	only	included	those	advancing	to	the	cooperation	
scenario.	 Both	models	 have	 a	 binary	 response	 variable	 (Cooperate/
Defect),	so	we	used	generalised	linear	mixed	effects	models	(GLMMs)	
with	binomial	error	structure	and	a	 logit	 link.	For	predictor	variables	
included	in	the	WTP	global	model	(see	Table	2):	CE1-	4,	IG1-	6	and	FO1-	
2.	Following	simplification	of	the	first	global	model,	only	predictor	vari-
ables	which	were	significant	in	at	least	one	of	the	best-	fitting	models	
were	included	in	the	global	model	for	the	cooperation	scenario	(CE1,	
CE4,	IG3-	4,	IG6,	FO1-	2).	Residential	location	(R1)	was	included	as	the	
random	variable	 for	both	models,	 and	unique	 identifier	 (R2)	was	 in-
cluded	in	the	cooperation	scenario	model	only,	as	it	contained	repeated	
measurements	from	individuals.	The	cooperation	scenario	model	also	
included	the	study	treatment	predictor	variable,	uncertainty	type	(sci-
entific,	administrative,	political	or	baseline/no	uncertainty).
2.7 | Willingness to pay – amount
The	WTP	amount	 global	model	 used	 the	 same	predictor	 and	 ran-
dom	variables	as	the	WTP	global	model	above.	The	response	vari-
able	was	amount	WTP	 in	British	Pounds.	We	used	a	 zero-	inflated	
mixed	 effects	 model	 with	 a	 negative	 binomial	 distribution,	 which	
accounts	for	the	large	difference	between	mean	and	variance	of	the	
responses	and	the	high	number	of	zeros	in	the	data	caused	by	those	
unwilling	to	cooperate	(UTC;	Zuur,	Ieno,	&	Elphick,	2010).
2.8 | Perception of others’ intention to cooperate
Predictor	 variables	 included	 in	 this	 global	model	were	 the	 same	 as	
for	 the	 cooperation	 scenario,	 with	 the	 addition	 of	 the	 measure	 of	
how	crofters	compared	their	own	goose	damage	with	that	of	others	
(Table	2,	 IG7)	 and	 a	 binary	 predictor	 (cooperate/defect)	 variable	
indicating	 if	 the	 crofter	had	chosen	 to	 cooperate	 themselves	under	
the	equivalent	scenario.	We	again	used	GLMMs	with	binomial	error	
structure	 and	 a	 logit	 link.	Data	were	 collected	 as	 a	wager.	Crofters	
readily	 engaged	with	 this	method,	 however	 responses	were	mostly	
constrained	to	a	narrow	numerical	range,	and	models	with	continuous	
responses	failed	to	converge.	Consequently,	we	converted	these	data	
into	a	binary	output.	If	the	wager	≥£10	across	the	range	51%–100%,	we	
recorded	that	the	crofter	believed	that	the	threshold	of	Uist	crofters	
required	to	initiate	the	goose	management	plan	would	be	passed.
3  | RESULTS
All	best	fitted	models	had	ΔAICc	≤	2	(Tables	S4–S7	for	the	output	of	
all	best	fitted	models).	Results	from	the	simplest	(lowest	number	of	
TABLE  2 Variables	measured	for	modelling	intention	to	
cooperate	and	willingness	to	pay	for	goose	management.	Not	all	
predictor	and	random	variables	were	included	in	all	models
Groups of variables Variables measured (units)
Crofting	experience 
R epresenting individuals’ connection 
to crofting and access to support
CE1:	Time	spent	as	a	crofter	
(years)
CE2:	Area	of	crofting	land	
(Hectares)
CE3:	Croft	owner	identity	
(North	Uist	Estate,	Storas	
Uibhist	community	estate,	
Scottish	Government	or	
owner	occupier)
CE4:	Township	in	Local	
Goose	Management	Group	
area	(yes	or	no)
Impact	of	geese 
R epresenting the range of direct 
impacts geese have on crofters
IG1:	Goose	damage	on	their	
croft	(yes	or	no)
IG2:	Incurring	of	financial	
costs	due	to	crop	loss	(yes	
or	no)
IG3:	Incurring	of	financial	
costs	from	scaring	geese	
(yes	or	no)
IG4:	Incurring	of	time	costs	
from	scaring	geese	
themselves	(yes	or	no)
IG5:	Personal	concern	about	
damage	to	natural	habitats	
by	geese	(yes	or	no)
IG6:	Personal	concern	about	
damage	to	other	crofters’	
crops	(yes	or	no)
IG7:	Damage	suffered	
compared	to	other	crofters	
in	the	Uists	(less,	similar,	
more	or	unsure)
Formal	organisations 
R epresenting engagement with formal 
groups involved in goose 
management
FO1:	Member	of	the	
Scottish	Crofting	
Federation	(yes	or	no)
FO2:	Awareness	of	the	
existing	goose	management	
plan	(yes	or	no)
Random	variables 
I ncluded to account for the structure 
of the data
R1:	Location	of	crofter	
(township)
R2:	Crofter	identification	
(unique	study	identification	
number)
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predictor	variables)	of	each	best	fitted	model	and	predicted	effect	
sizes	 are	 described	 below	 and	 in	 Tables	3	 and	 4.	 Population	 level	
data	for	each	predictor	variable	used	in	the	models	can	be	seen	in	
Supporting	Information.
3.1 | Intention to cooperate
Most	of	the	crofters	who	were	interviewed	(76.5%;	95%	CI	=	69.1%–
82.6%)	 were	 WTP	 for	 goose	 management.	 Reasons	 for	 crofters	
being	UTC	are	shown	in	Table	5.	The	most	common	reason	under	no	
uncertainty	was	that	geese	did	not	affect	them	enough.	In	the	pres-
ence	of	each	 type	of	uncertainty,	 the	most	 common	 reason	given	
for	UTC	behaviour	was	the	unsatisfactory	risk	of	a	worse	outcome	
compared	to	the	baseline	scenario.
Crofters’	concern	for	others	and	their	time	as	crofters	were	the	
two	significant	predictor	variables	(Figure	1,	Table	3).	The	longer	an	
individual	had	been	a	crofter	the	lower	the	predicted	probability	of	
cooperation	 (e.g.	 10	years	 of	 crofting	 P(coop)	=	0.75;	 50	years	 of	
crofting	P(coop)	=	0.51)	and	crofters	who	showed	concern	for	oth-
ers	had	a	higher	predicted	probability	of	cooperation	than	those	who	
did	not	(at	mean	time	crofting	(32	years),	showing	concern	for	others	
P(coop)	=	0.86,	no	concern	for	others	P(coop)	=	0.63)	(Table	4).	Fixed	
effects	accounted	for	13%	of	total	variation	in	the	model	but	there	
was	essentially	no	variation	between	locations	(Table	S4).	There	was	
no	 significant	 difference	 (assessed	 by	AICc)	 between	models	with	
and	without	the	random	variable.	The	AUC	of	the	ROC	was	0.72.
Under	all	 treatments	of	the	cooperation	scenario,	most	crofters	
were	WTP	 for	 goose	 management.	 Under	 the	 uncertainty	 scenar-
ios,	 type	 of	 uncertainty	was	 the	 only	 significant	 predictor	 variable	
for	 intention	 to	cooperate	 (Figure	1,	Table	3).	 In	 the	absence	of	un-
certainty	 (baseline),	predicted	probability	of	cooperation	was	>0.98	
(Table	4).	The	presence	of	each	of	the	three	types	(scientific,	admin-
istrative	 and	 political)	 significantly	 decreased	 the	 predicted	 proba-
bility	of	 cooperation	compared	 to	 the	baseline.	The	greatest	effect	
was	seen	in	the	administrative	scenario	(P(coop)	=	0.77),	followed	by	
small	but	significant	effects	with	scientific	(P(coop)	=	0.93)	and	polit-
ical	 (P(coop)	=	0.98)	 (Table	4).	 Fixed	 variables	 accounted	 for	 26%	of	
the	total	variation	and	variation	due	to	random	variables	accounted	
for	44%	(Rm
2	=	0.26,	Rc
2	=	0.70).	The	AUC	of	the	ROC	for	this	model	
was	0.96.
3.2 | Willingness to pay – amount
The	modal	WTP	amount	was	£50	per	year	and	the	mean	£59.81	per	
year.	Cost	of	goose	scaring	(time)	and	concern	for	others	suffering	
damage	 were	 the	 two	 significant	 predictor	 variables	 for	 WTP	
amount	(Figure	1,	Table	3).	A	crofter	who	had	not	spent	time	scaring	
geese	and	was	not	concerned	for	others	would	pay	£34.16	(Table	4),	
whereas	those	who	had	spent	time	scaring	geese	were	WTP	£73.98	
and	 those	 indicating	 concern	 for	 others	 would	 pay	 £52.27.	 The	
model	 variance	 attributable	 to	 crofter	 location	 (random	 variable)	
was	0.13	(Table	S4).
3.3 | Perception of others’ intention to cooperate
Individual	 cooperation,	 type	of	uncertainty,	membership	of	SCF	and	
perceived	 relative	 level	 of	 goose	 damage	 (Figure	1,	 Table	3)	were	 all	
significant	 predictor	 variables	 for	 perception	 of	 others’	 cooperation.	
Predictor variable
(a) 
Cooperation 
scenario
(b) 
Willingness 
to pay
(c)
Willingness to 
pay – amount
(d) 
Perception 
of others
Goose	damage	wrt	Uist	average
Less	damage −3.16*
More damage −3.82
Don’t	know 0.22
Membership	of	SCF −2.54
Time	as	a	crofter −0.97*
Cost	of	goose	scaring	
(time)
0.78***
Concern	for	others 1.30* 0.43*
Uncertainty	type
Scientific −3.20*** −1.84**
Administrative −4.57*** −2.94***
Political −2.10* −1.76**
Individual	cooperation 3.45***
Random	effects	
included
Location;	
participant
Location Location Participant
Receiver	operating	
characteristic;	area	
under curve
0.96 0.72 NA 0.99
TABLE  3 Standardised	effect	size	of	
predictor	variables	on:	intention	to	
cooperate	with	other	crofters	on	a	
cooperative	goose	management	plan	
under	different	types	of	uncertainty	(a)	or	
with	no	uncertainty	(b);	amount	willing	to	
pay	into	a	cooperative	goose	management	
plan	(c);	and	crofters’	prediction	of	others	
to	cooperate	(d).	Outputs	are	from	the	
simplest,	best-	fitting	models.	Effect	sizes	
have	been	standardised	*(p	<	0.05);	
**(p	<	0.01);	***(p	<	0.001)
     |  7Journal of Applied EcologyPOLLARD et AL.
Compared	to	a	baseline	(of	individual	cooperation,	no	uncertainty,	no	
membership	of	SCF	and	a	perceived	average	 level	of	goose	damage,	
P(coop)	=	0.93),	 the	 presence	 of	 each	 type	 of	 uncertainty	 had	 a	
negative	 effect	 on	 predicted	 probability	 of	 cooperation	 (Table	4).	
Again,	 the	 greatest	 effect	was	 seen	with	 administrative	 uncertainty	
(P(coop)	=	0.36),	 followed	 by	 scientific	 (P(coop)	=	0.63),	 and	 then	
political	(P(coop)	=	0.65).	Compared	to	the	baseline	model	those	who	
perceived	they	have	suffered	less	than	average	damage	were	less	likely	
to	predict	others	as	cooperating	(P(coop)	=	0.35).	Having	the	perception	
of	suffering	more	damage	than	others	or	a	‘don't	know’	response	had	
no	 significant	 impact,	 compared	 to	 those	 who	 had	 a	 perception	 of	
average	damage.	Compared	 to	 the	baseline	model,	 crofters	who	did	
not	 cooperate	 themselves	 were	 less	 likely	 to	 predict	 others	 would	
cooperate	also	(P(coop)	=	0.10).	Fixed	variables	account	for	27%	of	the	
total	 variation	 and	 variation	 due	 to	 random	 variables	 accounted	 for	
62%	(Rm
2	=	0.27,	Rc
2	=	0.88).	The	AUC	of	the	ROC	was	0.99.
4  | DISCUSSION
4.1 | How uncertainty affects crofters’ intention to 
cooperate
When	 faced	 with	 a	 choice	 of	 discrete	 courses	 of	 action,	 people	
generally	 select	 those	 with	 lower	 uncertainty	 (Kahneman	 &	
Tversky,	 1979;	 Lundhede,	 Jacobsen,	 Hanley,	 Strange,	 &	 Thorsen.,	
2015).	 This	 expectation	 is	 supported	 by	 our	 findings,	 with	 the	
presence	 of	 scientific	 uncertainty	 (from	 incomplete	 knowledge	 of	
the	 research	system),	administrative	uncertainty	 (surrounding	cost	
and	 responsibilities)	 and	 political	 uncertainty	 (regarding	 power	
relationships	and	values)	each	significantly	decreasing	the	predicted	
probability	of	cooperation	compared	to	a	baseline	scenario	with	no	
uncertainty.
Administrative	uncertainty	causes	the	largest	decrease	in	terms	
of	probability	of	cooperation.	The	administrative	treatment	was	pre-
sented	as	uncertainty	about	whether	public	funding	would	be	able	
to	either	pay	all	the	cost	of	the	management	plan	(thus,	free	for	the	
crofter)	or	pay	nothing	 towards	 the	plan	 (doubling	 the	cost	 to	 the	
crofter	compared	with	other	treatments).	A	view	of	shared	respon-
sibility	was	evident	under	the	scenario	of	administrative	uncertainty	
as	the	second	most	given	reason	for	defecting	was	that	others	should	
contribute	to	goose	management	(Table	5).	In	this	case,	administra-
tive	uncertainty	caused	crofters	to	question	the	commitment	of	an-
other	stakeholder	group,	causing	defection.
The	negative	effect	of	scientific	uncertainty	on	probability	of	co-
operation	was	small	but	statistically	significant.	Scientific	uncertainty	
was	framed	as	full	enactment	of	management	actions	but	with	ecolog-
ical	uncertainty	of	how	actions	would	affect	the	geese	and	the	result-
ing	level	of	damage	caused.	Here,	defecting	crofters	did	not	mention	
TABLE  4 Example	model	predictions	
to	illustrate	how	combinations	of	
significant	predictor	variables	affect:	
Probability	of	intention	to	cooperate,	
P(coop)	(models	a,	b	and	d)	or	willingness	
to	pay	amount,	£	(model	c).	Only	the	
simplest,	best-	fitting	models	are	shown.	
All	values	in	parentheses	are	95%	
confidence	intervals
Selected model structure Model prediction
(a)	Cooperation	scenario P(coop)
Baseline 0.98	(0.97–1.00)
+Scientific	Uncertainty 0.93	(0.81–0.98)
+Administrative	Uncertainty 0.77	(0.58–0.89)
+Political	Uncertainty 0.98	(0.91–0.99)
(b)	Willingness	to	pay P(coop)
a32	years	crofting	−	concern	for	others 0.63	(0.45–0.78)
a32	years	crofting	+	concern	for	others 0.86	(0.78–0.92)
10	years	crofting	−	concern	for	others 0.75	(0.45–0.92)
50	years	crofting	−	concern	for	others 0.51	(0.10–0.91)
(c)	Willingness	to	pay	−	Amount Willingness	to	pay	amount	(£)
−cost	of	goose	scaring	−	concern	for	others 34.16	(24.22–48.18)
−cost	of	goose	scaring	+	concern	for	others 52.27	(31.60–86.48)
+cost	of	goose	scaring	−	concern	for	others 73.98	(47.51–115.18)
(d)	Perception	of	others P(coop)
Goose	damage	wrt	Uist
bBaseline 0.93	(0.64–0.99)
−same	damage	+	less	damage 0.35	(0.11–0.71)
+Scientific	Uncertainty 0.63	(0.34–0.85)
+Administrative	Uncertainty 0.36	(0.16–0.65)
+Political	Uncertainty 0.65	(0.35–0.86)
−Individual	cooperation 0.10	(0.19–0.43)
a32	years	is	the	mean	time	crofting.	bBaseline	model	for	comparison:	Goose	damage	wrt	Uist	(same)	
-	uncertainty	+	Individual	cooperation	-	membership	of	the	SCF.	
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Reason
Scenario type (number of non- cooperation responses)
Cooperation scenario
WTP (34) Scientific (13) Admin. (29) Political (7)
The	issue	doesn’t	affect	
me	enough
12	(35.3%) 1	(7.7%) 3	(10.3%) 1	(14.3%)
I	will	be	leaving	crofting	
soon
7	(20.6%)
Goose	management	is	not	
possible
3	(8.8%)
Non-	crofting	groups	
should	(also)	contribute	
funding
8	(23.5%) 12	(41.4%)
Crofters	should	be	
individually	responsible
4	(11.8%) 1	(14.3%)
Not	enough	other	
crofters	will	cooperate
2	(15.4%) 1	(3.4%) 3	(42.9%)
There	is	too	much	risk 9	(69.2%) 15	(51.7%) 3	(42.9%)
Uncertainty	gives	excuse	
for	poor	management
1	(7.7%) 1	(14.3%)
TABLE  5 Reasons	given	by	crofters	for	
choosing	not	to	cooperate	in	the	
willingness	to	pay	(WTP)	and	in	the	three	
scenarios	with	uncertainty.	n	=	138	for	
WTP	and	97	for	the	other	three	scenarios.	
Crofters	were	asked	if	they	were	WTP	for	
goose	management	and	if	they	indicated	
they	would,	then	they	were	given	four	
further	choices	(cooperation	scenarios).	
The	baseline	treatment	is	not	included	in	
the	table	as	there	were	no	non-	
cooperation	responses.	Sum	of	
percentages	may	be	greater	than	100%	as	
crofters	could	give	more	than	one	reason
F I G U R E  1 Standardised	effect	size	(±95%	confidence	intervals)	of	predictor	variables	on:	intention	to	cooperate	with	other	crofters	
on	a	cooperative	goose	management	plan	under	different	types	of	uncertainty	(a)	or	with	no	uncertainty	(b);	amount	willing	to	pay	into	
a	cooperative	goose	management	plan	(c);	and	crofters’	prediction	of	others	to	cooperate	(d).	Outputs	are	from	the	simplest,	best-	fitting	
models.	Effect	sizes	have	been	standardised	*(p	<	0.05);	**(p	<	0.01);	***(p	<	0.001).	Full	model	outputs	in	Tables	S3–S6,	for	plots	a-	d,	
respectively
***
*
***
Admin.  
uncertainty
Scientific  
uncertainty
Political  
uncertainty
–6 0–4 –2
*
*
Time
as  
crofter
Concern
for  
others
–2 –1 20 1
*
***Time costof  
scaring
Concern
for  
others
0.00 1.000.25 0.50 0.75
*
**
***
**
***
Perceived damage (Don't know)
Perceived damage (More)
Perceived damage (Less)
Member of SCF
Political uncertainty
Admin. uncertainty
Scientific uncertainty
Individual cooperation
5–5 0
(c)
(a) (b)
(d)
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other	stakeholders	(as	with	administrative	uncertainty),	so	seemed	to	
be	reacting	to	uncertainty	directly	 (Table	3).	 In	this	scenario,	general	
aversion	to	uncertainty	may	be	contributing	to	much	of	the	decrease	
in	intention	to	cooperate	(Lundhede	et	al.,	2015).
Compared	 to	 the	baseline	scenario,	 the	decrease	 in	effect	size	
under	political	uncertainty	was	very	 small	but	 significant.	The	un-
certainty	in	this	scenario	affected	how	many	other	people	crofters	
thought	might	need	to	get	involved,	but	also	changed	the	conditions	
for	 accessing	 benefits	 without	 contribution.	 The	 small	 effect	 size	
means	 we	 cannot	 separate	 decreased	 probability	 of	 cooperation	
under	political	uncertainty	from	the	general	negative	utility	experi-
enced	from	any	type	of	uncertainty	(Lundhede	et	al.,	2015).
4.2 | Describing crofters’ cooperative behaviour
Financial	loss	via	goose	damage	was	not	a	significant	predictor	varia-
ble	for	any	model.	Crofters	were	more	likely	to	cooperate	on	a	goose	
management	plan	and	would	pay	more	into	such	a	plan	when	they	
indicated	concern	for	others	suffering	from	goose	impacts.	This	pat-
tern	of	cooperation	would	be	expected	if	goose	management	pay-
ments	were	 seen	more	 as	 a	 charitable	 donation	 than	 self-	serving	
(Park	&	Lee,	2015).	The	probability	of	cooperation	decreased	with	
increased	time	as	a	crofter.	This	result	may	be	driven	by	crofters	ap-
proaching	retirement	as	20%	of	crofters	who	chose	to	defect	gave	
the	reason	that	they	were	exiting	crofting	soon.
Many	crofters	chose	to	defect	but	not	one	crofter	indicated	that	
they	were	aiming	to	gain	benefits	without	contributing.	Crofters	may	
not	want	to	gain	benefits	this	way	because	they	see	it	as	unfair,	or	
they	would	not	want	to	be	seen	as	being	unfair	by	their	community.	
Small	agricultural	communities	have	strong	reciprocal	relationships	
between	 individuals	 (Sutherland	 &	 Burton,	 2011),	 which	 can	 de-
crease	behaviour	perceived	as	unfair	(Ostrom,	2010).
The	mean	WTP	 amount	 of	 £59.81	per	 year	was	 similar	 to	 the	
£29.67	 per	 year	 (£44.27,	 adjusted	 for	 inflation)	 which	 Hanley,	
MacMillan,	 Patterson,	 and	Wright	 (2003)	 showed	 in	 a	willingness	
to	accept	study	for	hypothetical	goose	population	increase	in	Islay,	
Scotland.	Those	who	have	spent	their	own	time	scaring	geese	were	
WTP	more	 into	a	cooperative	goose	management	plan.	Successful	
goose	 scaring	 is	 resource-	intensive,	 as	 the	 geese	 repeatedly	 be-
come	accustomed	to	the	methods	used	which	then	must	be	changed	
(Simonsen	 et	al.,	 2016).	 Our	 results	 indicate	 that	 the	 opportunity	
costs	associated	with	scaring	geese	are	important	enough	to	signifi-
cantly	increase	WTP	amount	in	the	Uists.
4.3 | Predicting others behaviour
The	largest	predictor	of	whether	crofters	thought	others	would	co-
operate	with	each	management	scheme	was	their	own	preference	
to	cooperate	or	defect.	All	types	of	uncertainty	were	also	significant	
in	 the	same	direction	and	 in	 the	same	rank	order	as	with	crofters’	
own	choices.	Individual	crofters	believed	other	crofters	in	the	Uists	
would	act	similarly	to	themselves	and	did	not	indicate	they	thought	
others	would	 attempt	 to	 gain	 benefits	without	 contributing.	 Both	
these	crofter	predictions	are	consistent	with	the	false	consensus	ef-
fect,	where	people	project	their	own	behaviour	onto	others	 (Ross,	
Greene,	&	House,	1977).
4.4 | Limitations of the method
The	use	of	contingent	valuation	methods	to	accurately	value	goods	
and	services	has	been	criticised.	For	example,	WTP	suffers	from	hy-
pothetical	biases,	differences	between	willingness	to	pay	and	will-
ingness	 to	accept	values	 for	similar	goods,	and	assumptions	about	
how	 goods	 may	 be	 embedded	 in	 one	 another	 (Hausman,	 2012).	
Hypothetical	 bias	 can	 be	 reduced	 by	 offering	 payments	 based	 on	
decisions	made	in	the	experiment,	but	it	can	unrealistically	incentiv-
ise	individualistic	behaviour	(Vohs,	Mead,	&	Goode,	2008).	Using	the	
WTP	amount	from	this	study	would	not	be	appropriate	for	costing	
of	 a	Uist	 goose	management	 funding	 scheme.	Where	 good,	 inde-
pendent,	data	are	available	for	goose	management	costs,	a	discrete	
choice	experiment	between	alternative	management	actions	could	
elicit	a	more	accurate	value	than	our	contingent	valuation	(Johnston	
et	al.,	2017).	The	WTP	variables	 in	our	modelling	did	not	 include	a	
measure	of	personal	wealth	or	 income,	which	may	be	expected	to	
have	 a	 significant	 influence	on	WTP	amount	 (Pearce	 et	al.,	 2002).	
The	aim	of	 identifying	an	 individual	WTP	amount	 for	each	crofter	
to	use	in	the	cooperation	scenario	was	achieved	with	our	method.
We	focused	on	the	predictor	variables	that	significantly	affect	co-
operation	and	on	the	difference	between	the	treatments.	However,	
people	also	tend	to	overestimate	WTP	amount	when	responding	to	
scenario	questions	compared	to	real-	life	situations	 (Murphy,	Allen,	
Stevens,	&	Weatherhead,	2005)	and	without	social	interaction	peo-
ple	overestimate	theirs	and	others’	propensity	to	cooperate	(Vlaev,	
2012).	Steps	were	taken	to	minimise	biases	of	methodological	origin,	
such	as	by	discussing	the	scenarios	 in	a	neutral	way.	Crofters	pre-
dicted	that	others	would	make	very	similar	choices	to	themselves,	
which	suggests	any	bias	towards	wanting	to	appear	in	a	good	light	
extended	 beyond	 themselves	 to	 promoting	 the	 community	 as	 a	
whole.	Separating	bias	from	the	social	norms	which	we	are	trying	to	
study	is	an	ongoing	challenge	in	field	studies	such	as	this.
4.5 | Management implications of multiple system 
uncertainties
The	 three	 sources	 of	 uncertainty	 affected	 crofters’	 intention	 to	
cooperate	 in	 different	 ways.	 In	 the	 presence	 of	 administrative	
uncertainty,	 defecting	 crofters	 indicated	 that	 other	 groups	 should	
shoulder	some	of	the	burden	caused	by	uncertainty.	In	the	presence	
of	 scientific	 uncertainty,	 no	 actions	 by	 any	 other	 group	 were	
mentioned	as	being	involved	in	crofter	cooperation.	In	the	presence	
of	political	uncertainty	 (and	 in	general),	 cooperating	crofters	were	
confident	 that	 others	 would	 act	 like	 them	 and	 not	 try	 to	 gain	
benefits	without	 contributing.	 Prior	 to	management	 actions	 being	
developed,	 an	 important	 step	 is	 for	 managers	 to	 understand	 the	
societal	 dimensions	 of	 a	 conflict,	 including	 stakeholder	 roles	 and	
actions	(Young	et	al.,	2016a).	Our	study	shows	that	managers	should	
10  |    Journal of Applied Ecology POLLARD et AL.
also	include	an	assessment	of	how	stakeholders’	actions	may	change	
under	 different	 sources	 of	 uncertainty,	 especially	 if	 sources	 are	
associated	with	particular	stakeholder	groups.
Once	 relationships	 are	 better	 understood,	 steps	 can	 then	 be	
taken	 to	 cope	 with	 uncertainty.	 Firstly,	 uncertainty	 could	 be	 re-
duced	by	filling	scientific	research	gaps	such	as	the	relative	efficacy	
of	scaring	techniques	or	goose	crop	selectivity	(Fox	et	al.,	2016).	But	
the	 application	 of	 increased	 ecological	 knowledge	 alone	may	 have	
suboptimal	 impact	on	conflict	 if	other	 types	of	uncertainty	are	not	
also	addressed.	Reducing	reliance	on	uncertain	external	funding	by	
increasing	 local	 fundraising	 may	 then	 decrease	 the	 administrative	
uncertainty	which	caused	the	greatest	decrease	 in	 intention	to	co-
operate.	Secondly,	in	addition	to	technical	solutions	for	uncertainty	
reduction,	stakeholders	should	indicate	a	high	level	of	commitment	
to	the	process	(Hemmati,	2002).	Longer-	term	partnerships	between	
managers	and	scientists	are	advantageous	(Moore,	Pascoe,	Thomas,	&	
Keatley,	2017)	and	transparent	communication	of	commitment	could	
lessen	 the	 effect	 that	 associated	 uncertainties	 can	 have	 on	 inten-
tion	to	cooperate.	Finally,	embracing	the	inevitable	uncertainty	can	
bring	positive	benefits,	such	as	opportunities	for	learning,	increased	
stakeholder	engagement	and	adaptability	 (Pe'er,	Mihoub,	Dislich,	&	
Matsinos,	2014).	Explicitly	including	multiple	types	of	uncertainty	in	
established	participatory	decision-	making	techniques	(such	as	multi-
criteria	decision-	making	or	scenario	planning)	may	decrease	the	neg-
ative	impact	of	uncertainty	on	levels	of	cooperation,	even	though	the	
calculated	level	of	uncertainty	has	not	reduced	(Mason	et	al.,	2018).
Cooperation	in	the	Uists	over	goose	management	has	been	es-
tablished	 through	 formation	 of	 the	 multi-	stakeholder	 LGMG	 and	
previous	 commitment	 to	 the	 5-	year	 adaptive	 management	 pilot.	
The	current	 level	of	 cooperation	between	stakeholders	may	be	at	
risk	 if	 future	 goose	management	 plans	 cannot	 reduce	 administra-
tive	uncertainty	(for	example,	by	securing	funding)	nor	demonstrate	
commitment	 to	 the	 project	 (for	 example,	 by	 enshrining	 another	
multi-	year	plan).
5  | CONCLUSIONS
Our	work	 illustrates	 the	 potential	 differences	 in	 stakeholders’	 re-
sponse	to	uncertainty	in	the	form	of	cooperation.	Reducing	scientific	
uncertainty,	at	which	conservation	practitioners	are	likely	to	be	most	
skilled,	may	not	be	the	most	important	gap	to	fill.	Variation	in	behav-
ioural	response	to	uncertainty	can	be	taken	into	account	throughout	
the	conflict	management	process	to	target	the	most	effective	ways	
to	either	preferentially	reduce	uncertainty	itself	or	increase	the	ac-
ceptance	of	uncertainty	amongst	stakeholders.	Both	tactics	mark	a	
way	forward	to	reducing	the	impacts	that	uncertainty	can	cause.
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